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Abstract
Conflict and development are commonly understood as two contradictory phenomena. Some
apparently self-evident ideas, such as gaps in development being a source of conflict and social and
political conflict being a major obstacle to development, have been revitalised by the debate about
the Arab Spring and used to orient development projects in the MENA region. This chapter aims to
explore a radically different perspective: we conceive development as a complex social relationship,
involving a vast constellation of actors, interests, logics, spaces, causalities and temporalities, and we
consider conflict in a multidimensional sense, as an expression of struggle, competition, tension,
resistance, opposition and critique. Conceived in these terms, conflict and development appear to be
strictly interlinked rather than opposites. Three particular configurations characterise development
as a ‘battlefield’: conflicts that create consensus around development; consensus as an expression of
conflict; and the definition of legitimate conflicts. There is special focus on the interconnection
between different temporal layers characterising the formation of the state and the transformation of
capitalism, and the consequences of development for society, the assertion of sovereignty, the
definition of social order and how people conduct their lives. This examination of the links between
development and conflict thus sheds fresh light on injustice, inequality, modes of government and on
how people interpret and live in political society far beyond the MENA region.
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1. Introduction
Except for studies in anthropology or in historical and political sociology that focus on
highly localised processes,1 few recent analyses have examined the process of development
in what is conventionally called the ‘MENA’ (Middle East and North Africa) region. After
the Arab Spring, the first timid approaches to the subject in the late 1990s and the decade
that followed2 gave way to an almost exclusive preoccupation with conflict. After 2011,
there were very few contributions dealing with this region in major journals devoted to
development issues3 and conflicts were discussed in terms of protests and social
movements, especially in Tunisia and Egypt,4 or in terms of armed conflicts and civil wars,
especially regarding Syria and Libya.5
1
This analytical turn rests on a multiplicity of causally self-evident observations
underpinning a rather widespread understanding of development and conflict, in which
the two terms are presented as two contradictory phenomena. However, it is still difficult
to provide an overview of the different ways in which the relationship between these two
phenomena has been understood over time. If we take the view that the discontent, social
movements, revolts and revolutions that the MENA region has experienced are in part
born of gaps in development, including the existence of pockets of poverty, the inadequate
integration of the region, and difficulties in getting young people into the labour market,
we are implicitly drawing on the presuppositions of theories of modernisation.6 These
theories see development as essentially pacificatory, as a vector of equality and justice and
as promoting inclusiveness and the dissemination of economic rationality, and thus as
alleviating conflict. In this evolutionary and ‘progressivist’ perspective, development—it is
claimed—can lead a society towards greater prosperity and, consequently, towards greater
equity, peace and consensus. According to this interpretation—adopted by the majority of
donors,7 the social conflicts facing the MENA region arise from the ineffectiveness of
development when viewed as a vector of equality and from its unexpected negative effects.
These analyses thus bolster the classic argument that various supposedly atavistic factors
are hindering the development of countries in the region. These factors include merely
cosmetic reforms and the limits of economic liberalisation in the face of the interests of
rentiers, clientelism, and the importance of ‘clans’; the constraining influence of religion
on economic behaviour, especially on the integration of women; and the way that wealth is
siphoned off into security apparatuses and sociopolitical groups linked to the
government.8
2
The social conflicts that have proliferated in the wake of the Arab Spring have often been
seen as further evidence of the conflictual and unstable nature of the societies in the
region. Echoing this, ‘reverse versions’ of this interpretation have developed in the form of
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analyses aimed at defining the negative effects of conflict on development. From this point
of view, conflict is seen as the main source of underdevelopment, or as an obstacle to the
pursuit of the aims of development. Violence, especially in the form of civil wars, is then
perceived as one of the main causes of poor economic performance and, even more, of the
growth of poverty in the world.9 Analyses sometimes focus on issues of conflict and then
show that violence feeds economic strategies that run counter to development. All analyses
of the ‘greed and grievance’10 kind that flourished in the second half of the 1990s, with the
end of the Cold War and the ‘renewal’ of armed conflict, fall within this paradigm: thus, it
is claimed that resources (natural resources, financial resources from international groups
or organisations such as migrants, or humanitarian aid) are turned into weapons of war,
strengthening not only the parties in conflict but also the murderous competition to
appropriate these resources.11 With the same self-assurance, other analysts take the
opposite view and argue for example that the fact that Tunisia was the first country to
revolt is not surprising, especially because it had a higher level of development than its
neighbours—witness its demographics and the level of education of its population.12
Others highlight the negative effects of the protests, outbreaks of violence and even civil
wars on the region’s development.13
These various arguments comprise a temporal and spatial sequence of supposedly ‘self-
evident’ relationships that are, in fact opposed, or even contradictory and incompatible—a
sequence made possible by the tangled interweaving of three simplistic modes of
reasoning. The first is undoubtedly the adoption of very narrow conceptions of the two
phenomena studied: the notion of development is understood in a limited and economistic
sense, purportedly neutral and expressed in growth rates; the notion of conflict is reduced
to war, physical violence or social protest.14 The second mode of reasoning, transposed
from the economy,15 is based on the premise that development and conflict are
independent of one another. This approach transforms these complex phenomena into
‘variables’, which makes it possible to seek patterns, and leads to the logics of development
and of conflict being separated: there cannot be any overlap between a ‘period of
development’ (characterised by a partial or complete absence of conflict) and a ‘period of
conflict’ (which in itself can hamper the process of development).16 Finally, the third mode
of reasoning, the causal mode reduced to its simplest expression,17 sees the relationship
between development and conflict as part of the search for one causality, ceteris paribus,
but also as falling within a normative analysis that claims to set out good and bad
practices, define good and bad development, perceive its failure or success and highlight
its positive or negative, beneficial or adverse effects.18
4
Beyond the MENA region and the Arab Spring, these modes of argument underlie and
promote expertise and development projects and their bureaucratisation. Thinking, within
decision-making bodies (by their ‘organic’ intellectuals), has indeed been heavily oriented
towards the quest for strategies aimed at ‘breaking the conflict trap’ and creating the
necessary conditions for the sole (or main) purpose of fostering the positive effects
expected from development.19 The so-called conflict-sensitive approach and its ‘do-not-
harm’ strategies20 are based on these assumptions. They were all responsible for the
exponential growth of various schemes that claimed to provide appropriate responses to
these new issues in cooperation and development policy. Manuals and training guides
devoted to these approaches provide a set of standards, procedures, dispositifs and
instruments to neutralise the conflicts arising from development projects.21 The extremely
commonplace processes that have made it possible to design these technologies, to make
them operational and reproducible, to rationalise them so that they can be assessed and to
standardise them to make them compatible and comparable has turned into a process that
produces indifference, one that has detached them from their very meaning. Paradoxically,
this process has produced other forms of coercion and domination22 that traditional
readings of the link between development and conflict neglect or completely ignore.
5
The limits of these perspectives become evident as soon as one engages in a rigorous
exploration of the meaning of the two terms. Instead of considering development as a one-
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2. Understanding How Different
Temporalities Are Interconnected
dimensional explanatory variable, we felt it would be more productive to define it as a
complex social relationship involving a vast constellation of actors, interests, logics,
spaces, causalities and temporalities; a social relationship that necessarily gives rise to
diverse understandings. Similarly, if we do not reduce conflict to civil war, protest
movements and the explicit use of violence, it can appear as an expression of struggle,
forms of competition, tensions, resistance, opposition and critique. By adopting these
complex and multidimensional meanings, an examination of the links between
development and conflict can shed fresh light on injustice, inequality and modes of
government, but also on the ways people understand and exist in political society. Then,
development cannot fail to foster simultaneously a number of trends and characteristics;
of different and even contradictory interpretations. It thereby becomes a more deep-rooted
factor in struggle, overt competition and the asymmetry of relations rather than an
element in convergence, harmony and the pacification of social relations.23
By observing development in all its conflictual nature, we have—in the present volume—
sought to transcend the aforementioned limits by integrating the logics of action and social
relationships, which are considered to be offset and out of scope by normative, mono-
causal arguments. The first of these limits concerns the relationship to time. Eschewing
analyses that claim that the temporality of development and the temporality of conflict
succeed one another, we have sought to understand the way they are interconnected by
situating the analysis of these relationships within national and global trajectories. Giving
them a historical setting has led us to understand, always in a contextualised and localised
way, what exactly development means, comprehending it as a multiplicity of combinations
of consensus and conflict—combinations that are not necessarily tense and paradoxical. By
shifting the focus to the link between development and conflict thus defined, this volume
also aims to question the relevance of the MENA region as a category of analysis, to the
extent that it homogenises utterly different political situations and development
practices.24
7
The sceptical gaze we are bringing to bear on this overall understanding of the region
does not stop us being sensitive to the existence of several major features common to the
various entities that comprise it. These extraverted societies have continually brought their
own historicity, including the nineteenth century reform movement—islah—into dialogue
with the Western matrix of development that emerged at the same time. All these societies
have been integrated, in their own ways, into the grand narrative of the nation that is
inseparable from the processes of globalisation, and have participated daily in the
transformations of modes of government that have shaped the great paradigms of
intervention with regard to development. We, as editors, felt that this return to history was
required, not to illustrate the evolutionary process to which development is often reduced,
but to show the diversity and originality of configurations bringing together development
and conflict over the years and to help us grasp the plurality of meanings of development
and its conflictual dimensions in the neo-liberal era in which we are currently living. If we
are to understand the interconnections of temporalities, we must not only take into
account the link between global trajectory and national or regional trajectories; we must
also consider the relationship between periods of development (with their specific
conception of the state and ways of governing) and periods of great events in history (such
as the fall of empires, the end of colonisation, the end of separatist nationalism after
decolonisation, and the end of industrial development). And we also need to take into
account the link between the ‘long periods’ of incremental transformations and periods of
contingency and abrupt change, and the connection between the ‘long periods’ of the
8
11/3/2021 Development as a Battlefield
https://journals.openedition.org/poldev/2301 5/23
intrinsic logics of development and the equally long, but more specific, span of human
memory.
Understanding the link between development and conflict requires first and foremost
that we situate the historicity proper to the region within the process of globalisation,
particularly in the related reconfiguration of international relations. In interpreting this
phenomenon without resorting to analyses focused on the clash of civilisations, on imports
(of the state, modernity, or the market)25 or on dependence,26 this reading highlights the
ambiguity and complexity of interactions between two global trajectories—that of
countries in the region and that which structures international relations in the context of
Western hegemony. In this way, it is possible to understand the specific ways in which the
great geostrategic conflicts have daily shaped the ideas, dispositifs and practices of
development in given societies.27
9
We need to go back to the eighteenth century to understand the process by which the
models of ‘Western’ and ‘Ottoman’ (or more generally Muslim) modernity grew apart and
then came into conflict, ending, in the nineteenth century, with the hegemonic self-
assertion of the Western model. As Nora Lafi suggests in her contribution to this volume,
the practices of development in the region in the late nineteenth century were not
reducible to the Ottoman configuration or to the subtle and ambiguous relations between
the Sublime Porte28 and the provinces. To understand them, our analysis needs to take
account of the tensions between this Ottoman configuration and the triumph of the
European world, and of the violence fomented by the colonial ambitions of the major
European nations, especially on the economic level. During the colonial period, this
tension was reflected in the coexistence of convergences, affinities and encounters between
these two modernities, but also in the open conflicts between them, for instance in matters
of education, administrative reorganisation and economic investment, as evidenced by the
discussions that took place within the colonised societies.29 As the Moroccan example
paradigmatically illustrates,30 this tension can also be seen in the processes of the
‘invention of tradition’ and the appropriation of tradition. The link between the
temporalities of development and conflict finds one of its international expressions in the
operation of the bipolar world that emerged from the Cold War. In the case analysed by
Anouck Gabriela Côrte-réal Pinto, the ‘Turkification’ of the defence industry—used both as
a lever of economic development and as a symbol of technological modernity—seems
inseparable from the climate of permanent conflict characteristic of the Cold War. As a full
member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), (and thus undoubtedly
belonging to the Western Bloc), Turkey has continuously tried to assert itself as a regional
player by insisting on its ‘non-aligned’ importance vis-à-vis its allies. In the case of
Afghanistan, as analysed in this volume by Fariba Adelkhah, this interconnection is
reflected in the coexistence of the time of development imposed by Western powers
through the assistance they have provided for reconstruction, and the time of ‘war as life’
that characterises national trajectory and creates conflicts conducive to the continuation of
this permanent state of war. These two experiences of the neo-liberal moment do not, of
course, exhaust the possible configurations of this crossing of trajectories.
10
Indeed, the plural and elastic dimension of what is called ‘neo-liberalism’ explains how a
very wide variety of forms exist behind the general principles presiding over its operation
(government by norms, procedures, rules and figures; the dissolution of the specificity of
the ‘public’ and the universalisation of the private as a benchmark of government; the
imperative to create frameworks for the development of market and business logics; the
replacement of general laws by pragmatism and case-by-case decisions; the replacement of
collective responsibility by individual responsibility, and so on). Thus, the areas covered in
this volume suggest that the neo-liberal hegemony can be understood and interpreted in
an open and pluralistic manner that goes beyond the standardising paradigm of
development in which guise it usually appears.31 These areas reveal direct forms of state
interventionism and strategies of delegation, the development of evergetic and charitable
practices on the part of private individuals and the redeployment of social policies, the
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mobilisation of associations and individuals in civil society and of large administrations,
and the engineering of both participation and planning. Thanks to this plasticity and the
existence of a multiplicity of ways of behaving and governing ‘neo-liberally’, each society
offers a range of behaviours and conducts that can extend to the expression of radical
alternatives and oppositions. Thus, consensus and conflict can exist simultaneously. In
this sense, Merieme Yafout’s article on the development activities implemented by
Moroccan Islamist associations that thereby seek to criticise the action of the state in this
area demonstrates clearly that models of society that in principle are completely opposed—
which some observers might read as ‘shocks’ of civilisation, rekindling the opposition
between East and West—can find in the neo-liberal development paradigm both common
ground and a place of conflict or even violence. The chapter by Adriana Kemp and Talia
Margalit, on urban development projects in Tel Aviv, convincingly shows that any
challenge to neo-liberal practices borrows from the very repertoire of the neo-liberal
paradigm—a paradigm that it also helps to renew.
The link between development and conflict must then be read as part of the historical
trajectory of the formation of states. In the region as elsewhere, conflicts mark out and
comprise this trajectory and mark the transition between different conceptions of the role
played by state authority in development in the imperial, colonial, national and neo-liberal
eras.32
12
In the Tunisian fez sector in the late nineteenth century, as studied by Nora Lafi, the
strategies deployed by the workers provide us with a concrete understanding of the
tensions that existed at the time between the imperial government and foreigners’
ambitions. The government aimed to foster the shift in the artisanal production of the
Tunis beylik towards proto-industrialisation through economic and administrative
reforms, while foreign actors, by introducing competition, further legitimised the process
of mechanisation, quickly generating conflicts within corporations and the colonial state
itself (in its role as an agent both of development and of protection in the sector). The
demands for the introduction of trade union rights in Sudan after the Second World War—
the theme of Elena Vezzadini’s contribution to this volume—take us to the heart of two
other ‘conflictualities’. The first conflictuality contrasts the different conceptions of
development found in the metropolis and reflects the transition from a colonial state that
highlights the importance of, and exploits, its colony to a colonial state that empowers its
colony and places it under its tutelage. The second conflictuality contrasts nationalists with
the supporters of a developmentalist colonisation likely to provide the future independent
state with its guiding principles.33 Marie Vannetzel analyses the trajectory of the Egyptian
state, which is emblematic of the developmentalist and interventionist nation state that
involves itself in groups and territories in the name of national interest. She focuses her
initial remarks on the ways in which the conflict between the government and the Muslim
Brotherhood is managed. She then examines the ways in which the different parties
mobilise this developmentalist imaginary in the heart of the neo-liberal period, a period
that encourages us to examine and interpret the conflicts between the multiple
conceptions of the role of the state in development. The various contributions to this
volume highlight the diversity of ‘what development means’ when the state reforms itself
in the name of neo-liberalism. It probably means liberalising but also nationalising; it also
means intervening directly and disinvesting in the name of rationality and competitiveness
in the private sector; and, yet again, it means using intermediaries and drawing on
unexpected convergences but also giving free rein to market forces. Yasmine Berriane
illustrates this trend with the emblematic example of collective lands in Morocco. She
shows that their commercialisation lies at the crossroads of several economic and social
issues linked to gender conflicts within society but also to conflicts between different social
groups and territories. Raphaëlle Chevrillon-Guibert highlights the regional asymmetry
characteristic of development in Islamist Sudan, an asymmetry that has widened under the
impact of the neo-liberalism proper to that country—namely, the combination of
13
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3. The Link between Development and
Conflict
institutional disinvestment and an increased reliance on the private sector in the form of
incentives to resort systematically to charity.34
The analysis of the link between transformations in modes of government and
transformations in capitalism constitutes a third approach to the link between
development and conflict. Many studies have shown that, worldwide, development
initiatives are indeed permeable to the major international economic paradigms, but that
they do not submit passively to them: they participate in the process of the appropriation,
adaptation and renewal of modes of government that are thus legitimised in the exercise of
their domination.35 Following this line of argument, the contributions in this volume
highlight the innovative and inventive dimensions of this process, dimensions that are
directly related to the specific characteristics of capitalism in historical configurations but
also in specific national or regional forms.
14
In her article, Ayşe Buğra distinguishes between the development process and
developmentalism defined as a strategy and as a legitimising discourse. She draws on the
Turkish trajectory to uncover the process by which development becomes, in a given
political situation, a knowledge of government, and shows how the shift from the paradigm
of interventionist development to the paradigm of regulative development, privatised and
decentralised, acquires particular and specific meaning in the capitalist configuration that
characterises it. By encouraging the decentralisation of powers, favouring regulation over
direct intervention and opting for the assessment of results rather than the planning of
interventions, these neo-liberal modes of governing create new margins of ownership,
negotiation and arrangement while renewing former practices.36 As suggested by the
example of the Casablanca Development Plan, analysed by Nadia Hachimi Alaoui, the neo-
liberal revolution, especially in its managerial component, and the modes of government
associated with the interests of the new players in Moroccan capitalism combine with the
permanence of the imaginary but also with the Makhzen’s practices of exercising power so
as to create spaces for negotiation and moments conducive to action in areas that go far
beyond development goals alone. By focusing on urban development in Tel Aviv, Adriana
Kemp and Talia Margalit highlight another important feature of the current period. They
show that those who are involved in development projects are not the only ones to provide
guidance for the interpretation of government paradigms; protest and resistance also
contribute to inventing, reformulating and legitimising these paradigms, partly because
they are part of the same political economy and reflect the same capitalist configuration.
15
This extremely flexible reading of conflict defined as a social and political conflictuality,
this approach sensitive to historical trajectories and their interconnections, is in the final
analysis closer to studies that have addressed the history of development in terms of the
singular narrative of endlessly reformulated expectations37 than to studies on the political
economy of development. The contributions in this volume may, to some degree, be read
as fragments of narratives of development seen through the prism of conflictuality,
allowing a very broad spectrum of social phenomena to be taken into account.
16
The contributions to this volume, then, form part of the historicity of globalisation, the
formation of states, and the transformation of modes of government, and aim to grasp the
links uniting these factors with periods of development and the connection between
development and conflict. They capture the multiple faces of development and modes of
conflict these faces convey, and they come at the problem from many different angles and
scales of observation. For example, it is possible to reconstruct this variety of facets (with
their different scales) by examining the vernacular terms, local translations and synonyms
used in specific situations to talk about development, but also the words often associated
17
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with them, albeit in a great variety of ways. This richness better reflects the complexity of
the relationship between development and conflict; we can move away from abstract and
general analysis to observe the way development becomes an ‘everyday’ feature38 through
what it means in concrete terms. This volume focuses specifically on this phenomenon,
examining the consequences of development for the organisation of social life, the
assertion of sovereignty, the definition of social order and the shaping of how one conducts
one’s life.39
To analyse development and the conflicts that may arise from it in everyday life, it is
thus appropriate firstly to analyse the reorganisation of social life in accordance with a
state model favouring continuity or territorial stability, the ethnic uniformity of the
population, the primacy of the individual over the group and competition between
individuals. By analysing international aid as a dispositif and as a form of knowledge of a
region (in this case Bamyan, in Afghanistan), Fariba Adelkhah shows that development
can trigger a process of ‘ethnicisation’ and religious ‘confessionalisation’ among those
participating in the political economy of aid, but also a process of territorialisation and
therefore the affirmation of specific identities. Her contribution suggests that aid for
development does not necessarily succeed conflict, even when it is intended to support the
reconstruction of a region. Instead, it allows conflicts to be perpetuated beyond open
warfare by supplying them with resources and providing them with a grammar. This
grammar of development transforms the conflicts that had once been expressed in a
warlike manner by giving them a diffuse and plural nature, albeit one that is not
necessarily less cruel. This is shown by the exacerbation of violence connected with
disputes over land, ethnicity and gender. The micro-social angle chosen by Yasmine
Berriane allows us to observe a process of this nature embodied by the Soulaliyate
movement. This movement arose in Morocco following the intensification of the
commodification of collective land formerly owned by the tribes, and is led by women
fighting against their exclusion from the process of the distribution of profits from the sale
of these lands. Yasmine Berriane shows that the grand idea of development can also lead
to the satisfaction of crassly pecuniary demands; in particular, she notes that development
initiatives are likely to intensify social inequalities through an asymmetric enhancement of
the territory and the ‘tribalisation’ of the individuals who inhabit it. Implicitly, the
Soulaliyate movement reflects the fact that different land requirements may also create
antagonisms between town and country, between different farming methods, and also
between different social strata. Raphaëlle Chevrillon-Guibert analyses the charitable
practices implemented by Darfuri traders in the Libya souk in Khartoum to benefit their
region of origin. Without international aid and social policies, the traders’ charitable
activities have become the main pillar of territorial development and the fight against
famine in Darfur, as in Khartoum. By transforming charity into the ‘government of the
social’,40 these initiatives undoubtedly reinforce the civilisation project fostered by the
Islamist government. But they also contribute to the ethnicisation and the
‘communitarisation’ of solidarity—the complete opposite of Islamist rhetoric. Thus, amid
the perpetuation of the war in Darfur, conflicts occur between different generations of
wealthy traders, but also between antagonistic clienteles, social groups and territories that
are all competing to qualify for aid.
18
This volume also approaches the links between development and conflict by analysing
the implications that development initiatives have had for the emergence of a sovereign
political authority and the sometimes conflictual modes of the assertion, exercise and
legitimation of sovereignty in a given society. The spectrum and variety of viewpoints
chosen by the authors highlight the characteristics of developmental conflicts in a specific
period and the impact these conflicts have on how sovereignty is conceived. By studying
the late Ottoman period, Nora Lafi captures the effects of development on the processes of
affirmation and legitimation of political authority. The petitions denouncing the collapse
of the fez industry in the Ottoman province of Tunis called into question the validity of
integration into international trade as a mode of development. The protest against
19
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international competition viewed as unfair and against the deteriorating living conditions
of workers following the mechanisation of the sector also denounced a new form of foreign
interference and domination and criticised an Ottoman rule that, in the view of artisans,
had become an agent of globalisation. Conflicts between the centre of the empire and the
provinces, as well as conflicts between the various economic interests in the Tunisian
province being studied, combined with conflicts with European powers to pave the way to
colonisation and the loss of sovereignty.
At the other chronological extremity of the colonial experience, Elena Vezzadini’s study
of Sudan highlights the comparable disputes over sovereignty that can arise during
national struggle. Immediately after the Second World War, the earliest legislation on
employment was introduced under the leadership of the nascent Sudanese trade union
movement and the developmentalist orientation of the colonial power, influenced by the
Keynesian paradigm that prevailed in England at the time. In a colonial context, the fact
that the development model took into account the right to employment paved the way for
an interpretation of development as a matter of citizenship, sovereignty and sociopolitical
order. Thus, alongside the nationalist conflict that would give birth to a sovereign
Sudanese government in 1956, there was a real proliferation of conflicts between different
levels of government, different generations of employees, but also between various
components of the nationalist movement, different ethnic groups and different economic
interests. By reconstructing the trajectory of the Turkish defence industry during and after
the Cold War, Anouck Gabriela Côrte Réal-Pinto views the issue of sovereignty from a
different angle. The official defence policy of the public authorities and the almost
continuous (but still incomplete and perhaps impossible) promotion of the ‘Turkification’
of the military–industrial complex were presented at once as an example, a proof and a
precondition of the country’s economic, technological and political development. These
investments were a pillar of the exercise of national sovereignty: lying at the heart of
government legitimacy for decades, they undoubtedly supported government action aimed
at defusing conflict with opposition movements. Moreover, they allowed recognition of the
survival of the state and the nation, and underpinned the power and greatness of a country
anxious to assert itself on the international stage in the name of a conflict forever on the
verge of breaking out. The Turkish word kalkınma masterfully expresses this idea, since it
includes the meaning of development, but also that of recovery and healing. To some
extent, the graduated reading (more or less, better or worse) of development evolved into a
binary reading (the life or death of the state) that forcefully enacted a consensus against a
background of conflict.
20
Analysis of the daily implications of development also allows us to observe the
characteristics of the sociopolitical order that is shaped through it.41 At this level, conflicts
of development may also set different actors, groups with conflicting interests, and
conflicting world views against one another. In a Gramscian perspective, different world
views, which coexist in an incoherent, disjointed and fragmentary manner, are the source
of a continuous reformulation of the assumptions that discipline the way people live
together through the conflicts they can trigger.42 This third perspective in this volume is
based on the work of Gramsci but also on other authors such as Polanyi (1944). Ayşe Buğra
proposes that we must define economics as a discipline and as a form of knowledge if we
are to grasp the way these different levels of conflict are interrelated in Turkey. She shows
that the discourse on development fosters a socio-economic order of progress,
modernisation and social cohesion and encompasses economic policies that have been
created by different and sometimes opposed theories. However, as a historically and
ideologically situated form of knowledge, conflict is expressed not only in its theoretical or
ideological form. By analysing the economic development strategies promoted in Turkey
before and after the country’s integration into the world market, it is possible to
understand the territorial, ethnic and class divisions within Turkish society and the
mainsprings of the political order that accompanied social conflicts, especially those
targeting Armenians and traditional rural society before liberalisation and, more recently,
21
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the conflicts that have set the secular urban elites against the new elites emerging from
political Islam.
The development strategy in Casablanca as analysed by Nadia Hachimi Alaoui is
emblematic of a sociopolitical order based on private initiative, territorial competition and
the devolution of power in the name of proximity. Through various initiatives based on
participation and consultation, the shapes assumed by notions of development seem so
imprecise that development may act as an instrument of government and domination,
despite the conflicts between different levels of political authority and between different
economic interests. These conflicts, played out in non-formal areas on the edges of the
development plan, have shaped the sociopolitical order that characterises Casablanca
today, emphasising an apolitical vision of development, technicising it by expertise,
excluding elected figures from consultations while integrating them into non-formal
spaces of negotiation and giving the wali43 the status of a major player in development.
The city is also the level of observation chosen by Adriana Kemp and Talia Margalit to
study the conflicts that development brings about in shaping modes of government and the
sociopolitical order. Complementing previous analyses, Kemp and Margalit show that
protests against the construction of high-rise buildings in Tel Aviv highlight issues of social
cohesion and the public interest of urban development. By targeting only the partial and
limited aspects of urban planning choices, these movements, often perceived as anti-neo-
liberal (and viewing themselves as such), do not resist the neo-liberalism of urban space
and the sociopolitical order but rather play a full part in them. Diffuse conflicts over
funding for public services and the privatisation of urban space arise behind the disputes
between the promoters of urban projects and their detractors, without challenging the
neo-liberal order.44
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Following Weber, the authors of the chapters in this volume also reflect the fact that
development can be a vector of the expression and construction of ‘the ways in which one
conducts one’s life’ and how they characterise different ‘types of person’.45 The multiplicity
of ‘material and thought-based interests’ that these concepts foster may result in
cohabitation, confrontation or sometimes even in opposition between different ways of
behaving and conceiving of the lives of individuals in society. The ‘constellation’ of
interest, logics and behaviours that development brings together does not presuppose the
existence of a spontaneous and peaceful harmony but of permanent adjustments resulting
from conflicts, antagonisms, struggles, competitiveness and asymmetrical relations that
lead to the emergence of different, sometimes even antagonistic worlds and world views.46
In this fourth and final perspective, the authors have often chosen Islamist movements as
a starting point for exploring the links between development and conflict. Marie Vannetzel
and Merieme Yafout, respectively, study the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and the Wal
Ihsane movement in Morocco using different scales of observation. Marie Vannetzel
focuses on the continuity of the developmentalist imaginary before and after the fall of
Mubarak and on the tensions between the imaginaries and the practices of development
that have resulted. Merieme Yafout, meanwhile, examines a particular district in
Casablanca, analysing the activities promoted by a development association whose female
members are supporters of the Al Adl Wal Ihsane movement. In the case of Egypt,
development is problematised through the distribution of benefits and the fostering of the
spirit of service, while in the case of Morocco, it is understood as a process of emancipation
and construction of ‘ways in which one conducts one’s life’ based on positive personal
social, economic and spiritual development. Going beyond the supposed existence of a
conflict between a secular and an Islamic way of development (an idea systematically used
in political speeches, in the community of development practitioners and in public
debates), it is possible to highlight much more subtle conflicts between those two
convictions, which are not rigid but constantly changing and evolving and continue to
redeploy themselves through concrete ways of living in society.
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4. Recognising the Coexistence of
Consensus and Conflict on the Battlefield
of Development
Development thus appears at once as a discourse, a practice, an ideology, a paradigm, a
dispositif, a fiction and a power relationship. More importantly, the chapters of this
volume point out that the meaning of development as a social action cannot fail to be
historical and cultural. If they highlight national and regional differences, they also
illustrate the reality of globalisation and its ideological and cultural hegemonies.
Development appears as a relevant indicator of the degree of globalisation of the MENA
region, where the political situation is all too often analysed as specific or exceptional.
Each chapter places national experiences back in the context of a trajectory conditioned by
generalising, global paradigms. Conceptions of development are not identical, and their
links to conflict are not only plural but undefined and unstable. Once we abandon an
abstract and general standpoint and instead observe development in its day-to-day form,
the richness of this approach gives us a better understanding of the complexity of the
relationship between development and conflict.
24
Beyond these variations, there appears one common feature: development helps build a
consensus inseparable from the expression of conflicts. This becomes merely an apparent
rather than a real paradox once we rid ourselves of simplistic visions of consensus. In the
Weberian and Gramscian perspective adopted here, the convergence of norms, practices
and interests is not the result of an intentional action or of supposed harmony, nor does it
arise from a sharing of values, conceptions or meanings.47 Instead, the multiplicity of
perspectives and understandings, the differences of interests, and the plurality of logics of
action feed into a continuous reformulation of the implicit factors that allow people to live
together, precisely through the conflicts they are forever triggering. From this perspective,
the distinction between developers and the developed—like that between rulers and those
ruled and between the dominant and the dominated—is of little interest if our aim is to
grasp the relationship between development and conflict: any active player is part of a
world view in which development is constructed as a consensual subject, while helping to
preserve this conception, to modify it, and to create new ones.48
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On the basis of shared beliefs and imaginaries, development presents itself as an
indisputable fact.49 At least two factors help explain this consensus. First, economic forms
of knowledge of development tend to be considered as technical, objective and
independent. This stance is based on the fiction that the economic sphere is independent
of all political processes and able to regulate itself. The consensual nature of development
stems partly from the way in which initiatives undertaken in its name are usually
constructed and planned using tools that are intended to be technical and neutral in order
to intervene on problematics themselves considered as objective. By questioning the
objectivity of development, we recognise that it can be a place for the expression of
subjectivity, values and ethics. Similarly, the fact that major development paradigms are
legitimised internationally and that the expertise that accompanies them is often foreign—
when aid itself is not directly foreign—helps give development an apparent neutrality that
facilitates consensus. By questioning the neutrality of foreign intervention, we recognise
that development can have different meanings in specific political situations. Second, the
link forged between development and imaginaries of modernisation, progress and
rationality also contributes to establishing this consensus: development is unanimously
considered a desirable objective. Beyond the positive moral connotations generally
associated with development, we need to carefully consider the processes of prioritisation
and interests as well as the inequalities and asymmetries that any development initiative
brings with it. By choosing as a case study ‘development conflicts’, we wanted to focus our
reflection on the ‘frictions’50 that any experience of development generates. This stance has
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enabled us to simultaneously take into account the different conflicts and different kinds of
understanding and apprehension of development and the consensus constructed around
them, while defining development as a ‘battlefield’ on which prioritisation, discrimination
and, ultimately, processes of domination are played out.51 The situations analysed in the
various chapters of this volume have helped to highlight three configurations that have
structured this special volume.
The first part, entitled ‘Conflicts that Create Consensus’, brings together a series of
articles that show in particular that disputes relating to the organisation of social life, the
assertion of sovereignty, the definition of a social order or the construction of ‘the ways in
which one conducts one’s life’ contribute to creating a consensus on development, or at
least to reinforcing it. Conflicts are necessary for a certain conception of development to
become hegemonic. Hegemony, as Gramsci says, is born of conflicts and perpetuates itself
through them.52 To understand these conflicts, it is necessary to try and grasp power and
domination relationships without limiting oneself to the concepts of coercion and the
exercise of physical force and to give all necessary attention to the mechanisms that allow
values and interests to be considered as true and natural, even though they are based on
discriminatory and hierarchical processes. From this perspective, the point of transition
between different hegemonic paradigms of development is a propitious moment at which
to observe how conflicts build consensus. By studying, respectively, the assertive phase of
neo-liberal developmentalism in Turkey and the role of industrialisation in the
modernisation of the Ottoman province of Tunis, Ayşe Buğra and Nora Lafi show that the
conflicts that accompany the shift from one consensus to another are related to the
processes of ‘creative destruction’53 that punctuate the transformations of capitalism.
Examining the case of Sudan as it achieved independence, Elena Vezzadini places less
emphasis on the role of internal transformations within capitalism than on the paradigms
that connect capitalism with the struggle for the establishment of an independent,
modernising nation state. Finally, Merieme Yafout stresses the importance of laissez-faire
and disengagement in the assertion of consensus with regard to a hegemonic vision of
development in Morocco.
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The articles in the second part—entitled ‘Consensus as An Expression of Conflict’—
highlight various examples of consensus with regard to development as a quintessential
expression of tensions and conflicts that go well beyond such development. Indeed,
development is never the work of a single group of actors who take the initiative. It should
be understood as the result of a web of relationships and a constellation of social actions
carried out by a variety of actors rather than as an explicit public policy that is definite,
focused and unambiguous (a vision characteristic of analyses of conventional public
policies). Beyond the theme of brokers and intermediaries, it is important to consider the
actors by whom development is furthered and interpreted—those who give it its colour and
meaning, thanks to their style, ethos and modes of behaviour. In other words, one cannot
understand the practical and conflictual dimensions of development without taking into
account those people whom Weber called the ‘bearers’ of development.54 By considering
them in all their diversity, it is possible to observe the process by which their consensual
actions vis-à-vis development can become the main field of expression for conflicts: these
are embodied in the various conceptions of the common good, of the public interest and of
development as well as in the many modes in which these objectives can be achieved,
modes linked to different conceptions of the state and the exercise of power. Consensus
about development can thus be a vector for the perpetuation and exacerbation of conflicts,
as in the Afghan province of Bamyan, analysed in this volume by Fariba Adelkhah.
Conversely, in their analysis of protests against urban projects in Tel Aviv, Adriana Kemp
and Talia Margalit show that conflicts can paradoxically express a consensus. And
consensus can also conceal conflicts of networks, power and temporality, such as those
expressed in the implementation of the development plan for the city of Casablanca,
studied by Nadia Hachimi Alaoui. Marie Vannetzel, finally, gives us another vision of this
relationship between consensus and conflict by showing that in Egypt, for several decades,
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the whole machinery of development harboured conflicts of position between the
nationalist elite and the Muslim Brotherhood; this machinery came to halt when conflict
gave way to the triumph of one of the parties involved.
The third part, entitled ‘The Definition of Legitimate Conflicts’, addresses the theme of
this volume from the vantage point of the contribution of development initiatives to the
apprehension of questions of legitimacy. Development cannot be neutral if it is to avoid
being ineffective. It does not appear here in the naive, technical, apolitical and sanitised
guise that is often associated with it, but is presented as a targeted and thus inegalitarian
social action (even if the targeting is extremely broad), an action that favours certain
objectives and priorities over others, even if these are all numerous and contradictory.
Development is by definition an action that differentiates and discriminates, often in the
name of the war on inequality.55 It is nonetheless a social action that influences processes
of legitimation by modifying the representations of the state, of political space, and of
social justice. The conflictual dimension of development is evident in the way its results
are assessed, its inequalities are grasped, and the injustices it fosters are managed; but also
in the way the violence inherent in any social action is fully taken into account. The neo-
liberal consensus on development defined as a process of modernisation, reform and
market expansion can then lead to the drawing of a distinction between legitimate and
illegitimate conflicts, as suggested by Yasmine Berriane in her analysis of the
commodification of collective lands in Morocco. In the case of Sudan, Raphaëlle
Chevrillon-Guibert highlights the fact that the constitutive asymmetries of consensus
regarding development can also generate conflicts. Anouck Gabriela Côrte-réal Pinto, in
turn, draws on the case of Turkey to remind us that it is essential to understand the means
by which the national-liberal consensus underlying the developmentalist fiction makes
conflicts acceptable, tolerable, marginal or even legitimate.
29
In our view, this threefold perspective contributes to the renewal of approaches usually
adopted by studies in the social sciences to interpret the sociopolitical and economic
situation in the MENA region.
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First, this perspective undermines the idea that these countries are exceptions to the
rule. This idea comes in different forms, including that of the ungovernability of the
region’s societies. The intrinsic contrast between the state and the population—related to
the extraneous nature of the former and the indiscipline of the latter, or to the fact that
state actors are detached from social processes—explains, it is said, the alternation of
periods of submission and revolt, and makes these societies ungovernable.56 The study by
Adriana Kemp and Talia Margalit, and Ayşe Buğra’s contribution to this volume, suggest
that the neo-liberal moment cannot be reduced to a contrast between the state and society.
Instead, they highlight a hegemony that underlies the conflicts and brings together ways of
ruling and ways of opposing the rulers. In other words, neo-liberal practices form a
common basis for the deployment of relations, interests and processes in which conflict
and consensus, domination and resistance, inclusion and exclusion are interwoven. The
idea that these countries are exceptions to the rule is also reflected in the way their
markets are viewed as imperfect. This argument, often developed in terms of the
economies of rent—particularly in the case of oil-producing countries and those that live
by the exploitation of other natural or geopolitical resources, licit or illicit—is based on a
historicist reading of the evolution of these countries and the idea that imperial and
colonial experiences have imposed limits on the market economy.57 Nora Lafi, Elena
Vezzadini, Yasmine Berriane, and Anouck Gabriela Côrte-réal Pinto challenge this
interpretation, and put forward three counterarguments: the inherently indigenous nature
of the market, the importance of national movements in its appropriation and the ongoing
process of reinvention that it is currently undergoing, for instance by the gradual
placement of ‘fictitious commodities’ on the market.58 Finally, the chapters in this volume
offer an implicit critique of this idea of ‘exceptionality’ in the urban setting. With some
significant exceptions, the literature on cities in the MENA region suggests that these are
affected only marginally, and passively, by globalisation.59 Nadia Hachimi Alaoui, Adriana
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Kemp, and Talia Margalit show instead that analyses on an urban scale allow for a detailed
reading of the interrelationship between the space of the city and globalisation.
Second, this threefold perspective relativises and even undermines the idea that Islam
and the strength of feeling inherent in ethnic identity act as barriers to development. In
line with the theories of modernisation, it claims that Islam and ethnicity are based on
values and beliefs incompatible with modernity, rationality and technical development.60
Moreover, the low level of development supposedly fuels the rise of political Islam and the
persistence of ethnicity.61 The contributions of Merieme Yafout, Mary Vannetzel,
Raphaëlle Chevrillon, and Anouck Gabriela Côrte-réal Pinto suggest the existence of
different links between development and political Islam. They show that political Islam
‘ordinarily’ uses strategies of extraversion and fashionable international rhetoric and argue
that it has thus become just as ‘developmentalist’ as secular political trends and plays a
part in the neo-liberal paradigm as much as do other political movements. These authors
also defend the view that religious reference points are an alternative source of legitimacy
for new elites and enable the creation of new alliances that depoliticise inequality in the
name of Muslim solidarity.62 By exploring the reinvention of ethnicity and social and
political bonds that has been produced by the processes of development, Fariba Adelkhah
and Yasmine Berriane also address the relationship between ethnicity and development in
a new way. The conception of the role and place of women in Muslim or Mediterranean
societies is often mentioned in this literature as another impediment to development.63
Yasmine Berriane and Merieme Yafout address gender issues from a very different angle
and show that women participate in the renewal of power relations within political
movements and, moreover, that their positions as women contribute to legitimising
certain struggles (and thus to delegitimising many others) and to the inclusion of certain
actors (and thus to the exclusion of certain others).
32
Finally, looking at development via the connection between conflict and consensus
allows us to see anew the issue of violence in the region.64 These different approaches
invite us to think about violence on the basis of the constitutive asymmetries of society
rather than examining it frontally as a separate phenomenon; these asymmetries are
considered as the normal and commonplace components of political relations and the
exercise of power and not as features found only in the countries of the MENA region.
Ultimately, many of our stances converge on a deconstruction of the concept of the MENA
region defined as a well-delineated cultural and geopolitical area or as a homogeneous
ensemble characterised by common trends in development.65 By favouring one situated
moment (the neo-liberal moment) and developing our argument on the basis of specific
locations (geographic, but also sectoral, economic and cultural locations), this volume
explores common conceptions of the region from a new angle so as to highlight the
diversity of development patterns and thus the possible links between development and
conflict. Multiplying disciplinary approaches—from history to political economy via
anthropology and political sociology—we have abandoned a purely geographical or
regional framework to adopt one that encompasses the relationship between global and
local dimensions, including necessarily local perspectives on globalisation. Development is
not analysed here as an explanatory variable or as an inevitable consequence, much less as
revealing a stabilised ‘culture’ or the ‘nature’ of societies. It is defined as a set of complex
social relations and a balance of power, oscillating constantly between consensus and
conflict, a definition that highlights the extreme diversity of the situations observed. This is
what prompted us to put together this volume by taking the liberty of not remaining
faithful to the boundaries conventionally attributed to this cultural area and not seeking
regularities, convergences or divergences. Algeria, Libya, Syria, and Jordan are not among
the countries studied, but we provide analyses of certain political situations often left on
the margins or outside the supposed boundaries of the region, including Turkey and
Afghanistan for ethnic reasons, Sudan for geographical reasons and Israel for religious and
historical reasons. As the reader will have realised, the MENA region has been—for us—
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simply a pretext; a concrete place to think in general and generic terms of development as
a ‘battlefield’.66
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Notes
1 See Elyachar (2005) on self-entrepreneurship in Cairo, Bono (2010) on the phenomena of
participation in the Moroccan town of El Hajeb, and Canesse (2014) on rural development policy in
the Tunisia of Ben Ali. Implemented between 2008 and 2011, the Agence Nationale de la Recherche
(French National Research Agency) programme, ‘Tanmia. Le "Développement" : fabrique de l’action
publique dans le monde arabe ?”, contributed to fostering studies on development in the region. The
work produced in this context includes Catusse et al. (2010), Abu-Sada and Challand (2011), Ruiz de
Elvira (2013) and Sbeih (2014).
2 See in particular Santucci and El Malki (1990) and Henry and Springborg (2001). Note also the
launch of the Middle East Development Journal in 2009.
3 For example, the Journal of Development Studies did not refer to any country in the region
between volume 46-10 (November 2010) and volume 50-9 (September 2014). By not publishing any
article referring to the Arab Spring after 2011, the Middle East Development Journal made a
significant editorial decision. In the same trend, in 2011 the Revue Tiers Monde devoted a special
issue to the conflicts and protest movements present in the region: see Ben Néfissa (2011).
4 Camau and Vairel (2014) and Rougier and Lacroix (2015) address the cases of Tunisia and Egypt,
respectively, from this point of view.
5 This view of conflict is particularly central in Burgat and Paoli (2013). It also underlies the
discussion of the role of ISIS (also known as Daesh and ISIL) in the Arab world expressed in Fellous
(2015).
6 Rostow (1960) is one of the main proponents of this school of thought. Gilman (2003) provides us
with material for further reflection on the relationship between conflict and development in theories
of modernization.
7 Among the most recent examples of this, see in particular the World Bank (2015) and USAID
(2015).
8 Analyses that consider these characteristics as typical of the countries in the region go back several
years. Among the first authors to highlight them were Gellner and Waterbury (1977) and later
Heydemann (2004). After the Arab Spring, these arguments were at the heart of the various studies
on the ‘political economy of the Arab Spring’, including Springborg (2011), Malik and Bassem (2013)
and Cammett et al. (2015).
9 See in particular the World Bank (2005). This argument is developed analytically in North et al.
(2013).
10 The expression comes from Collier (2000a; 2000b). These arguments have also been developed
in Jean and Rufin (1996), Kaldor (1999), and Collier and Hoeffler (2002; 2004)
11 Within the community of practitioners, these arguments have in particular been raised by the
Development Assistance Committee (OECD-DAC, 1997).
12 See Todd (2011).
13 See Amin et al. (2012). The financial press and the grey literature from donors are full of articles
or reports on the subject.
14 From another very interesting point of view, albeit almost the complete opposite of our own,
Cramer (2006) shows that when conflicts are examined from the angle of development, they are
reduced to what becomes an oversimplified reality.
15 Marchal and Messiant (2002; 2003) pioneered this critique.
16 This argument lies at the heart of the World Bank’s World Development Report 2011 (Word Bank,
2011).
17   For a critical view of the link between development and security, see Duffield (2007) and the
debate on his book in the periodical Politique Africaine (Ambrosetti et al., 2012).
18 See, e.g., Thomas et al. (2000).
19 See the eloquent title of the World Bank report (World Bank, 2003).
20 For these approaches, see Leonhardt (2002) and Anderson (1999). For a critical analysis, see
Schloms (2005). These arguments have been mainly developed in the grey literature. See, for
World Bank (2003) Breaking the Conflict Trap. Civil War and Development Policy (Washington
D.C.: World Bank), DOI: 10.1596/978-0-8213-5481-0.
Yacobi, H. (2009) The Jewish-Arab City. Spatio-politics in a Mixed Community (London, New
York: Routledge).
11/3/2021 Development as a Battlefield
https://journals.openedition.org/poldev/2301 21/23
example, The Collaborative for Development Action, http://www.cdainc.com or
http://territoires.ecoledelapaix.org/mali/methode-do-no-harm (accessed on 13 July 2016).
21 For example, Conflict Sensitivity Consortium (2012) See also the ‘resource pack’ of PFO,
CECORE, CHA, FEWER: International Alert, Saferworld, Conflict-Sensitive Approaches to
Development, Humanitarian Assistance and Peacebuilding. A Resource Pack,
http://www.saferworld.org.uk/resources/view-resource/148-conflict-sensitive-approaches-to-
development-humanitarian-assistance-and-peacebuilding (accessed on 13 July 2016).
22 These processes are highlighted and analysed, in other contexts, by Hibou (2015) and Samuel
(2013; 2014).
23 Bono et al. (2015) argue for this view, drawing on Weber and his confrontational conception of
social relations (Weber, 1968).
24 In line with the ideas put forward in Bayart (2016).
25 As shown by Huntington (1996) and Badie (1992), whose ideas have caused significant
reverberations in the academic and political worlds.
26 In line with the work of Frank (1968), Cardoso and Faletto (1979) and Amin (1974).
27 This approach is based mainly on Wallerstein (1979), Lonsdale (1981), Cooper (1981), Bayart
(1989) and Arrighi (1994).
28 The Sublime Porte was the name of the Ottoman court at Constantinople.
29 For Tunisia, see Berque (1967), Mahjoubi (1982), Tlili (1984), Kraïem (1990), Sraïeb (1995) and
Ben Achour (1996). For an overview, see Hibou (2009).
30 On this aspect, see Adam (1972), Rabinow (1995), Tozy (1999) and Hibou (2006).
31 On the diversity of neo-liberal principles, see Saad-Filho and Johnston (2005), Nemo and Petitot
(2006), Plehwe et al. (2006), Dardot and Laval (2013) and Peck (2010). On the diversity of neo-
liberal practices, there are many studies, but see especially Laurie and Bondie (2005), Ong (2006),
Chang et al. (2012) and Peck and Theodore (2015).
32 On these aspects, see especially Bayart (2010).
33 These contrasts are highlighted in Mitchell (1991) and Berman and Lonsdale (1992).
34 For similar analyses in other contexts, see Kuran (2003), Bonner et al. (2003), Haenni (2005)
and Singer (2008).
35 On Africa, in particular see Ferguson (1990) and Hibou (1998). For a more general reflection on
this aspect, see Hibou (2011).
36 This aspect is also addressed by Hibou (2015) and Samuel (2013).
37 This is, in particular, the point of view of Cooper (2010) and Eckert et al. (2010).
38 Weber’s Veralltäglichung is not translated here as it is usually rendered (‘routinization’) but as
‘mode of penetration in everyday life’, following Grossein’s French translation (quotidianisation)
and interpretation. See Grossein 2006: 68; 123-24.
39 This problematisation was developed by Weber: see especially Weber (1971) and Chalcraft, D. J.,
and A. Harrington (eds) (2001).
40 For our conception of the government of the social, we refer the reader to our previous work,
especially Hibou and Bono (2016).
41 A study by Ayşe Buğra (2007), who considers this issue from the viewpoint of unequal practices of
citizenship, is particularly useful for developing this perspective.
42 This is one of the central ideas in Gramsci (2011). On the concept of dislocation in Gramsci’s
thought, see Prestipino (2009).
43 A wali is a state representative at the territorial level. See Hachimi Alaoui (2016).
44 The way in which protest movements have contributed to the consolidation of the neo-liberal
order in Israel has already been stressed in connection with microfinance by Kemp and Berkovitch
(2013). For a general discussion of this process in the neo-liberal era, see Hibou (2015).
Theoretically, this process had already been emphasized by Weber (1978).
45 See especially Weber (1971) and Chalcraft, D. J., and A. Harrington (eds) (2001).
46 This problematic, which we adopted in order to analyse the government of the social in Morocco
(Bono and Hibou 2016), is developed by Weber (1968). See Grossein (2005, 2016).
47 We develop this argument at length in Bono and Hibou (2016), drawing on Weber (1968 and
1971) and Gramsci (2011).
48 On the multiple meanings of the subject in the processes of government, see also the reading of
Foucault’s conception of ‘governmentality’ in globalization proposed by Bayart (2007).
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49 These issues are addressed in Rist (2002) and Cooper (2010).
50 On problematisation in terms of friction, see Tsing (2004).
51 For the same approach as applied to the government of the social, see Hibou and Bono (2016).
52 See Gramsci (2011). The analysis of Gramsci’s terminology in Frosini and Liguori (2004)
highlights this aspect.
53 To use the terminology proposed by Schumpeter (2010).
54 Weber (1971), as highlighted by Grossein (2006).
55 Bono (2014) has analysed in these terms the construction of the ‘responsible indigent’ and the
‘employable young person’ as target categories for development aid to Morocco.
56 For example, see Salamé (1994), Waterbury (1994) and Ayubi (1996). Those analyses that aim to
establish the winner of the showdown between the state and civil society share this vision: see for
example Fernández Molina (2011).
57 See in particular Beblawi and Luciani (1987), Richards and Waterbury (1996) and Henry and
Springborg (2001).
58  This is the view of Polanyi (1944).
59 Authors who oppose this trend include Yacobi (2009) and Peraldi and Tozy (2011). For a critical
analysis of this literature in the context of the Arab Spring, see Allegra et al. (2013).
60 The questioning of the relationship between Islam and modernity is a theme treated by Lewis
(2003) and more recently by Masud et al. (2009).
61 Kepel’s work (2003; 2006) rests on the idea that Islamism is a monolithic bloc whose birth was
mainly due to an alliance between a deprived younger generation and a pious bourgeoisie.
62 Following Haenni (2005) and Tozy and Hibou (2015).
63 This argument is omnipresent in the grey literature and in public debate. Various scholarly
analyses and popular books have attempted to move beyond these stereotypes; Mernissi (1987) and
Kandiyoti (1991) are among the first of these.
64 For a history of violence in the region, see Bozarslan (2008).
65 Our implicit critique of thinking in terms of ‘cultural areas’ draws on the analysis of this topic
explicitly developed by Jean-François Bayart (2016).
66 This eloquent phrase is obviously borrowed from Enzo Traverso (2012), whose approach,
combining the history of ideas, the history of practices and the history of contexts, has inspired us.
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